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Postcolonial International Law Discourses on Regional
Developments in South and Southeast Asia

DIANE A. DESIERTO*

The development of international law in South and Southeast Asia
exemplifies myriad ideological strands, historical origins, and significant
contributions to contemporary international law doctrines’ formative and
codification processes. From the beginnings of South and Southeast Asian
participation in the international legal order, international law discourse from
these regions has been thematically postcolonial and substantively
development-oriented. Postcolonialism in South and Southeast Asian
conceptions of international law is an ongoing dialectical project of revisioning international legal thought and its normative directions --- towards
identifying, collocating, and applying South and Southeast Asian values and
philosophical traditions alongside the Euro-American ideologies that, since
the classical Post-Westphalian era, have largely infused the content of
positivist international law.1 Of increasing necessity to the intricacies of the
postmodern international legal system and its institutions is how the
postcolonial project of South and Southeast Asian international legal
discourse focuses on areas of international law that create the most urgent
*
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1
Arif Dirlik, Postmodernity’s Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project
(Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000) 63-89; RP Anand, Studies in
International Law and History: An Asian Perspective (Brill Academic Publishers,
Massachussetts USA 2004) 24-102; David Fidler, ‘The Asian Century: Implications
for International Law’, (2005) 9 SYBIL 19-35; Nicholas Onuf, “Tainted by
Contingency’: Retelling the Story of International Law” in Richard Falk, Lester
Edwin J. Ruiz, and RBJ Walker (eds), Reframing the International: Law, Culture,
Politics (Routledge, New York, 2002). See also Barry Buzan and Richard Little,
“The Idea of ‘International System’: Theory Meets History”, (1994) International
Political Science Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, 231-255.
387

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

388

[Vol. 36.3

development consequences: trade, investment, and the international
economic order; the law of the sea and the environment; international
humanitarian law, self-determination, socio-economic and cultural human
rights.2
The nature and extent of the engagement with international law,
however, differs for each region. South Asian international law literature
reflects a longer historical engagement with the development of international
law from antiquity to postcolonialism. The development of certain principles
of modern international law, such as immunities, diplomatic protocol, the
conclusion of treaties, maritime principles on freedom of commerce and
navigation and the high seas regime, have been attributed to Asian-European
interactions from the 16th to 18th centuries,3 where the most prominent Asian
countries that came into contact with European powers during this period
were the Mughal Empire in India, the Maratha State in India, the Kingdoms of
Burma and Ceylon, Indonesian states, among others.4 Specifically, India’s
ancient civilization was a veritable source of rules on inter-state conduct, from
the laws of war, the law of treaties, the right of asylum, the treatment of aliens
and foreign nationals, the modes of acquiring territory, and rules on
navigation and inter-state trade.5
At the same time during this period, positivist international law (as it
was then crystallizing as a concrete ideological discipline in Europe) was
being grounded on the “development of the Family of Nations based entirely
on [positivists’] own 19th century ideology and doctrine which they tended to
project backwards into the past as if the past had not had its own ideology and
legal doctrine.”6 During this period, classical positivist international law
would emerge as a “self-contained system...with an ideology of its own”,
where international lawyers and scholars occupied a central role in taking up
2

SK Agrawala (tr), TS Rama Rao and JN Saxena, New Horizons of International
Law and Developing Countries (N.M. Tripathia Private Limited, 1983); Sienho Yee,
‘The Role of Law in the Formation of Regional Perspectives in Human Rights and
Regional Systems for the Protection of Human Rights: The European and Asian
Models as Illustrations’ (2004) 8 SYBIL 157-164.
3
CH Alexandrowicz, An Introduction to the History of the Law of Nations in the
East Indies (16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries), (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967).
4
CH Alexandrowicz, The Afro-Asian States and International Law, Recueil de
Cours, Vol. 123 (1968), 124.
5
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India, (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, Germany 2005) 1-5, 29-30, 39-40, 54-55, 108109, 121-130.
6
Id. at note 5, at 125.
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the task of codifying and legitimating the law of nations.7 The eventual
dominance of classical positivist international law, and the ensuing power
asymmetries in the international legal order, would have critical implications
on the modes of legal justification articulated to exculpate the European
powers from their treatment of India and other ancient Asian states during the
colonization era.
Southeast Asian international legal scholarship, on the other hand, is
deemed of more recent vintage, accounted for by long suppression or
inhibition as a consequence of the power relations and political structures
endemic to the colonization period,8 and, unlike the ancient Indian civilization
in South Asia, is marked by the fairly recent emergence of Southeast Asian
states in the postmodern international legal system.9 While possessing some
common religio-cultural dimensions, the numerous Southeast Asian states
represent a full spectrum of political, legal, and ideological diversity that
veers away from the typical homogeneity of most regional groupings.10 The
concept of ‘Southeast Asia’ is itself an artificial construct, made “almost by
accident, from World War II, when, at the Quebec Conference in August
1943, the Western Allies decided to establish a separate South East Asia
Command (SEAC), embracing Burma, Malaya, Sumatra, and Thailand.”11
The pervasiveness of this diversity has made stamping a ‘Southeast Asian’
mark on international law a polemical process of apprehending and
reconciling diverse bases of authority and legal orders.
Southeast Asian law has been described as an “accretion of layers of
law and legal culture, as distinct from a mere progression from one
7

Id. at note 5, at 126. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:
The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press,
United Kingdom, 2002).
8
For the seminal work on colonialism’s operative effects on positivist
conceptions of international law, see Antony Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries:
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law’ (1999) 40
Harv. Int’l L.J. 1-80; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
9
M. Sornarajah, ‘The Asian Perspective to International Law in the Age of
Globalization’, (2001) 5 SJICL 284-313; Nicholas Tarling, Nations and States in
Southeast Asia (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 45-111.
10
ASEAN Law Association, ASEAN Legal Systems (Butterworths Asia, 1995);
Carmelo V. Sison and Roshan T. Jose (trs), Constitutional and Legal Systems of the
ASEAN Countries (University of the Philippines, 1990).
11
Kevin YL Tan, ‘The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia:
An Overview’, (2002) 6 SJICL 1-41.
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conception of law to another,” where “...every kind of religious or secular law
or source of law; every kind of dispute-resolution process; every kind of
constitution and law-making process; with a few extra ones arising out of the
incessant problems of legal conflicts, has been evidenced in South East Asia.
Every kind of legal ‘reception’ has occurred. In most of Southeast Asia, and
all of maritime Southeast Asia, many of these traditions have lived side-byside in a kind of pluralistic abandon.”12
The differences in ideological development of international law in
South and Southeast Asia are not coincidental, and should be understood
against the broader context of pre-modern to postmodern Asian participation
in the international legal order.13 Asian contributions to international law and
membership in international institutions have been as numerous, diverse and
widespread as the region’s composite states. Among many contemporary
international law doctrines, Asia has proposed and/or authored concepts such
as the Exclusive Economic Zone, the establishment of international
machinery to govern sea-bed regimes beyond national jurisdiction, principles
on decolonization and the right to self-determination, the rights of indigenous
peoples and other socio-economic rights, among others.14 South and
Southeast Asian states, in particular, have frequently sought international
adjudication over contested territorial sovereignty and/or maritime issues, as
seen most recently from the International Court of Justice’ 23 May 2008
Judgment in the Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks, and South Ledge. 15
Asian participation in the international legal system also shows both
vertical and horizontal legalization, as well as deepening and widening
commitments, of the state and non-state actors, especially international
12

Andrew Harding, “Comparative Law and Legal Transplantation in South East
Asia: Making Sense of the ‘Nomic Din” in David Nelken and Johannes Feest (eds),
Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart Publishing, Oxford-Portland Oregon, 2001).
13
See Allah Bukhsh Karim Bukhsh Brohi (ed), Five Lectures on Asia and the
United Nations (Recueil de Cours, Volume 102, 1968).
14
T.O. Elias, New Horizons in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1992) 29-43.
15
Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pedra Blanca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle
Rocks, and South Ledge (Malaysia v. Singapore) [2008] ICJ Rep 130; See Case
Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v.
Malaysia) [2002] ICJ Rep; Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia
v. Thailand) [1962] ICJ Rep 6. See also Hisashi Owada, ‘The Experience of Asia
with International Adjudication’ (2005) 9 SYBIL 9-18.
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organizations in the region.16 The overall pattern of these many circumstances
of Asian engagement of international law would evoke critical questions on
the traditional dominance of (Euro-American) canons and methods of
positivist international law.17
Among several “new” theoretical (and usually constructivist18)
approaches to contemporary international law, the scholarship of Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) drew significant and widespread
support from South and Southeast Asian countries early on in the postcolonial
and post-independence period of the twentieth century. TWAIL is a politicalideological movement that arose from the landmark 1955 Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia.19 The Bandung conference
assembled many states that had either regained sovereignty or were newlyindependent,20 and whose Declaration of Principles21 eventually became the
precursor for the non-alignment and neutrality policies of many South and
Southeast Asian states.22
TWAIL advances a distinct critique of, and alternative narratives
from, mainstream international legal scholarship by making various
challenges to the morality of the international legal order, as when it: “1) uses
16

See Jose E. Alvarez, ‘Institutionalized Legalisation and the Asia-Pacific
‘Region’, (2007) 5 N.Z.J. Pub. & Int’l L. 9.
17
See Richard A. Falk, “Is the International Legal Order Eurocentric?” in The
New States and the International Legal Order, Recueil de Cours, Vol. 118 (1966), 3443.
18
See Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law” in Gerry Simpson
(ed), The Nature of International Law (Dartmouth Publishing Company, England,
2001).
19
RP Anand, “Jawaharlal Nehru and International Law and Relations” in Studies
in International Law and History: An Asian Perspective (Brill Academic Publishers,
Massachusetts USA, 2004); Final Communique of the Asian-African Conference,
Bandung, 24 April 1955, available at
http://www.issafrica.org/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/asiaafrica/bandung55.pdf
(last visited 20 October 2008).
20
Richard A. Falk, The New States and the International Legal Order, Recueil de
Cours, Volume 118 (1966), 10-25.
21
See George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung,
Indonesia, 1955 (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1970).
22
Sisir K. Gupta, ‘Asian Nonalignment’ (November 1965) 362 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 44-51; Rajen Harshe, ‘India’s
Non-Alignment: An Attempt at Conceptual Reconstruction’ (February 17-24, 1990)
25 Economic and Political Weekly, 399-405.
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colonial history to frame the impact of international law on the South; 2)
avoids prioritizing the universal above the local; and 3) focuses on the
interrelation between international capital and non-European cultural
traditions.”23 In the context of assessing developments in contemporary
international law, TWAIL raises caution and calls for resistance against recolonization that could be facilitated by the changing shape of the postmodern
international legal system: “...the meaning of the reconstitution of the
relationship between State and international law is the creation of fertile
conditions for the global operation of capital and the promotion, extension,
and protection of internationalised property rights. A transnational ruling elite
has emerged, with the ruling elite of the third world playing a junior role,
which guides this process. It is seeking to create a global system of
governance suited to the needs of transnational capital but to the disadvantage
of third world peoples.
The entire ongoing process of redefinition of State sovereignty is
being justified through the ideological apparatuses of the Northern States and
international institutions [they] control.”24 TWAIL attempts the critical decontextualization of Eurocentrism as the dominant and exclusively
‘legitimate’ tradition of international law, and calls for sensitivity towards
international institutions, modalities, and procedures that could possibly
perpetuate re-colonization through hegemonic subjugation of the emerging
states in the international legal order.25
A monolithic approach to characterizing international law in South
and Southeast Asia therefore does little justice to the regions’ rich diversity
and complex history. At the same time, however, international legal scholars
must also be mindful of excessive reliance on history that produces
23

Andrew F. Sunter, ‘TWAIL as Naturalized Epistemological Inquiry’ (2007) 20
Can. J. L. & Juris. 475, at 487-488; see David P. Fidler, ‘Revolt Against or From
Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of
International Law’ (2003) 2 Chinese J. Int’l L. 29.
24
B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto”, in
Antony Anghie, Bhupinder Chimni, Karin Mickelson, and Obiora Okafor (eds), The
Third World and International Order: Law, Politics and Globalization (Brill
Academic Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2003); Makau Mutua, ‘What is
TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 31-40.
25
As a theoretical platform for international legal scholarship, however, TWAIL
has not yet gone beyond the level of pure critique. It has not provided concrete
alternatives or viable ‘solutions’ to problems of the modern international system. See
B.S. Chimni, International Law and World Order: A Critique of Contemporary
Approaches (Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California, 1993).
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“manipulated appearances of reality, while, in fact, alienating the observer
and simplifying the links between motives, causes, stakes, and outcomes.” 26
The following discussion of regional developments in South and
Southeast Asia proposes to begin from the initial acknowledgment that these
regions’ discursive contributions to modern international law originate from
separate but parallel paths --- both of which are jointly contoured along theme
of postcolonialism and the orientation towards development. South and
Southeast Asian regional developments in international law are presented
from within this ideological dichotomy.
South Asia and International Law
Uniquely, Indian scholars point to the fundamental international law
concept of universal applicability of rules as ancient India’s central
contribution to the modern law of nations.27 Indian perspectives on
contributions to international law have been traced across four chronological
periods:
1. the ancient period (up to 711 AD);
2. the middle ages (711 to 1600 AD);
3. the colonial period (1600 to 1947); and
4. the modern period (1947 onwards).28
Ancient India was generally composed of small and large kingdoms,
ruled by monarchs enjoying various degrees of power and prominence (the
least powerful being a Raja or king, followed by a Maharaja or great king, a
Samrat or strong emperor, to the most powerful being the Chakravartin or
emperor who ruled the entire known world).29 The profusion of kingdoms
and the experience of warfare and internecine conflict in Ancient India led to
the development of inter-state norms on statehood, diplomatic relations,

26

Outi Korhonen, ‘The Role of History in International Law’ (2000) 94 Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 45-46.
27
Nagendra Singh, “India and International Law” in RP Anand (ed), Asian States
and the Development of Universal International Law (Vikas Publications, Delhi,
India, 1972).
28
V.S. Mani, ‘An Indian Perspective on the Evolution of International Law on
the Threshold of the Third Millenium’ (2000) 9 Asian Y.B. Int’l L. 31-77.
29
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany 2005), 28-30.
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treaties, religious tolerance, non-use of force, neutrality and humanitarian
law.30
The deeply-embedded practice of these norms of inter-state conduct
in ancient India, long before the advent of Christianity in the West, challenges
the prevalent view of international law as ‘mainly rooted in Christian
civilizations and natural law conceptions’.31 Concepts such as the just war or
Dharma Yuddha, the unjust war or Adharma Yuddha, the laws applicable to
all belligerents at all times in the context of warfare or Dharmasastras (which
included, among others, principles of distinction of targets, proportionality,
and protection of civilians), collectively show that the application of norms
based on fundamental considerations of humanity in situations of belligerency
had long antedated the formal codification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.32
Inter-state relations in Ancient India were also organized along
different tiers of statehood, sovereignty, kinship, and within a hierarchy of
suzerain-vassal relations.33 Ancient India’s trade linkages with China, Arabia,
Egypt, Greece, Rome and East Africa necessitated protocols and rules on
diplomatic relations and the creation of various Superintendents for
Commerce, Ships, and Passports, while various Indian states furthered interstate diplomatic relations by establishing special missions in each other’s
capitals. Treaties were recognized to be of a binding character depending on
the nature of the treaty and the security of its performance, a practice that
arguably presaged the notion of “unequal treaties” in international law.34
The use of force to settle conflicts with other states, previously an
axis of state policy, was formally renounced by Emperor Asoka during the
Maurya Dynasty, leading to imperial India’s policy of non-use of force and
neutrality.35 These policies, coupled with the spread of Ancient India’s
largely Hindu and Buddhist religions, became instrumental in the pacifist
establishment of colonies in Southeast Asia (the Sri Vijaya empire in Sumatra

30

Id. at note 19.
Id.; see Onuma Yasuaki, ‘When Was the Law of International Society Born?
An Inquiry of the History of International Law from an Intercivilizational
Perspective’ (2000) 2 J. Hist. Int’l L. 1.
32
Id. at note 16.
33
Id. at note 19, at 34.
34
Id. at note 2; see Ingrid Detter, ‘The Problem of Unequal Treaties’ (1966) 15
Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 1069-1089.
35
Id. at note 19, at 38-41.
31
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and Java, the Kingdom of Kambojadesa in Cambodia, and the thirteen (13)
dynasties of Champa) from the second century AD onwards.36
Beginning with initial raids by Afghanistan’s Sultan Mahmud of
Ghazni in 991 AD until the consolidation of the Mughal Empire from 1526 to
1707, the surge of Muslim conquests of India during its medieval era would
prove crucial for the emergence of norms on religious freedom and basic
respect for religious diversity. The juxtaposition of Islam and Hindu beliefs
in the ever-widening population of ancient Indian empires made harmonious
inter-religion relations the immediate pragmatic concern of Indian
governors.37
As a result of the imperial policy mandating respect for religious
diversity, Islamic rule under the Mughal Empire was, by and large, peaceable.
There was continuity in the rules of inter-state conduct towards other Indian
states, vassals, and ancient Asian trading partners. The Mughal emperors
“respected the institutions of embassies, treaties, and laws of peace and war.
They had a written code of law, applied by their judges, called kazis, which
regulated relation between state and subjects inter se. Their notions of
sovereignty and kingship had been inherited from their predecessors, the
Hindu empires like the Guptas and the Mauryas, and the Sultanate of Delhi.”38
Notwithstanding any political changes introduced by the Mughal
empire in medieval India, however, the European powers did not alter their
settled practice of dealing with Indian heads of state as sovereigns. Various
heads of state within the Indian territories functioned under suzerainty
relations with the Mughal Empire, a political relationship that permitted
retention of most sovereign rights and administrative prerogatives over their
respective territories.
The International Court of Justice recognized this form of suzerainvassal relationship in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v.
India),39 where, following a historical examination of the nature and form of
treaty-making in ancient Indian legal traditions, the Court affirmed the
36

Id. at note 16, at 36-37. Id. at note 17.
Id. at note 19. RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and
India (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 35-40.
38
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 39.
39
Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v. India) (Merits) [1960] ICJ
Rep 6.
37
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sovereign capacity of an Indian ruler (the Peshwa of the Maratha State, a
vassal of the Mughal empire) to conclude the Treaty of Poona of 1779.
Rejecting Portugal’s claims of sovereignty over the disputed enclaves of
Dadra, Nagar, Aveli, and surrounding territories, the narrow Court majority
upheld the Peshwa’s interpretation of this Treaty, which had granted to the
Portuguese merely a revenue tenure, or saranjam, and not sovereign rights,
over such territories.
The colonial era featured a conceptual ‘division of sovereignty’ by
European public authorities (British governors of India, for example, would
organize hundreds of ‘Princely’ or ‘Native States’ that were ‘semisovereign’). Colonial rule was characterized by the “gradual acquisition of
prerogatives from indigenous rulers”, initially by publicly-owned state
enterprises such as the English East India Company, and later on, through
official imperial administrators from the European states. While the initial
motivation of colonialism was mercantilist in nature, this motivation would be
subsumed within the larger rhetoric of European empires: the (ostensible)
responsibility to “promote civilization” and “good government” in countries
that had long been subject of ‘indigenous’ rule.40 In this manner, the core
international law principle of respect for sovereign states degenerated into an
antithetical selectivity and arbitrariness of states deemed ‘deserving’ of
sovereignty by other, more powerful states.41 One scholar describes this
colonialist notion of sovereignty as “a part of the relevant neo-absolutist
concept prevailing in Europe at the time... [where] a metropolitan state
possessed ‘absolute sovereignty’ over its colonies and nothing bound it in its
relations with colonized peoples when it established the order and content of
these relations solely at its own discretion.”42
The establishment and entrenchment of British colonial rule in India
was patently illegal for subverting the fundamental international legal doctrine
of equality of states, but was seemingly justified under international law
principles that recognized the use of force or conquest as a legitimate basis for
40

Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and
Order in World Politics (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002), 76-96.
41
RP Anand, “Equality of States in an Unequal World: A Historical
Perspective”, in Sovereign Equality of States, Recueil de Cours, Vol. 197 (1986), 52100.
42
Christos Theodoropoulos, Colonialism and General International Law: The
Contemporary Theory of National Sovereignty and Self-determination (New Horizon
Publishing House, Benin, Nigeria, 1988), 23. See also Lauren Benton, Law and
Colonial Cultures (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002), 1-30.
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acquisition of territory.43 The British annexation of India began innocuously
with trade monopolies held by the English East India Company, which, after
various historical intermediations by British officials and (forced)
capitulations by Indian rulers, eventually led to the acquisition and
administration of Indian territories by the English East India Company under
the 1657 Cromwell Charter, and over two centuries later, to the 1858 Queen’s
Proclamation and Act of Parliament that formally declared British takeover of
the government of India, with British Queen Victoria being formally
proclaimed ‘Empress of India’ in 1876.
The unjust and unlawful displacement of Indian sovereigns by British
imperial rulers repudiated the settled pre-colonization European practice,
where, as a renowned Indian international law scholar observed, “...nonChristian states enjoyed full sovereignty and exercised the right of sending
and receiving ambassadors. Such views had earlier been expressed by Jean
Bodin, and were later endorsed by Hugo Grotius in his famous Mare Liberum,
published in 1609. Nobody ever questioned the right of the Indian states to
make war or peace, conclude treaties, send embassies, or exercise their
sovereign jurisdiction within their territories. Grotius accepted and
recognized the sovereign status of the Indian rulers although they were
‘infidels’, and argued that Portugal had no right over them on account of their
religious beliefs. No constitutive theory of recognition existed before the
nineteenth century...the Indian rulers acted as sovereign entities, made war
and peace, concluded treaties, and exchanged embassies. The European
countries participated with them without questioning their legal status.”44 The
imperial design of colonialism thus exposed the failure of international law at
the time to abide by its objective of attaining universal applicability to all
peoples of humanist aspirations and humanitarian rules of conduct.45
There were many ideological and conceptual consequences from the
forcible imposition of European legal institutions and international law
traditions on India during the colonial period. Long before European
43

Id. at note 19. Id. at note 20, pp. 65-69. See Island of Palmas case
(Netherlands v. USA), 4 April 1928, II RIAA 829-871, at 839. Full text available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_II/829-871.pdf (last visited 20 October
2008).
44
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India (Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 54-55.
45
Peter Fitzpatrick, “Terminal Legality: Imperialism and the (de)composition of
Law” in Diane Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, Law, History, Colonialism: The
Reach of Empire (Manchester University Press, United Kingdom, 2001).
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colonialism made its appearance, many Asian sovereign peoples had already
established and were already practicing international maritime principles such
as “freedom of the seas, the rules of flag state jurisdiction on the seas,
superior coastal state jurisdiction over all ships while near the coast,
prohibition of piracy, the rules of charter-party, customs and tolls, permits of
entry and departure, and even some rules relating to contraband.”46
Neither of these practices, nor India’s participation in the
international legal order, would be substantially altered or dissolved in the
period of colonization. Instead, British India would be treated as a “separate
State, with an international legal personality of its own. It was a member of
the League of Nations. It became party to the Statute of the Permanent Court
of Justice and the General Act on the Pacific Settlement of Disputes of 1928.
It entered into treaties and ratified them. It had the dubious distinction of
being the only country that ratified the 1937 Geneva Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, which the UK and other countries
did not ratify. British India also participated in the San Francisco Conference
that led to the establishment of the United Nations.”47 India’s position from
1919 to 1947 would be that of an “anomalous international person”,
exercising some powers of self-governance yet devoid of the full attributes of
statehood since control of internal and external relations still remained with
the British Government and its Parliament.48
British India’s possession of limited international legal personality
under British rule necessarily made the Indian normative system susceptible
to the influences of classical positivist international law. British judges in
several pre-independence cases in India would apply classical positivist (and
necessarily Eurocentric) principles of international law as part of the Indian
legal system. The result was that “...early in the history of India, the Common
Law principle that international law is part of the law of the land became a
part of India’s legacy.”49 This principle, along with the concept of the rule of

46

Id. at note 18, at 56.
Pemmaraju Sreenivasa Rao, “The Indian Position on Some General Principles
of International Law”, in Bimal N. Patel (ed), India and International Law (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, the Netherlands, 2005).
48
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India(Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 78-84.
49
M.S. Nawaz, The Changing Law of Nations: An Indian Focus (Eastern Law
House, Calcutta, India, 2000), 7-9. See also S.K. Agarwala, India’s Contribution to
the Development of International Law --- the Role of Indian Courts, in RP Anand
47
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law, would have significant influences on the growth and direction of
international law in India. Similar to the experiences of other colonial states,
the infusion (through doctrines of incorporation and/or treaty transformation)
of Eurocentric positivist international law norms into would have significant
impacts on the present-day content and interpretation of South and Southeast
Asian laws.50
British Raj (British rule over the Indian subcontinent) would
terminate in 1947 with the official Partition of the British Indian Empire
(hereafter, ‘Partition’) into two (2) separate, self-governing, sovereign
dominions: the Dominion of Pakistan declared independent on August 14,
1947 (and whose territory included the territories of present-day Pakistan and
Bangladesh); and on August 15, 1947, the Union of India (later replaced by
the Republic of India on January 26, 1950). The two largest provinces of the
British Indian Empire, Punjab and Bengal, would be subdivided between the
Dominion of Pakistan and the Union of India.51
The Partition would also impact British treatment of other South
Asian states. 52 In parallel with the termination of British Raj over ancient
Indian territories, Britain would likewise recognize the independence of
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) as a sovereign Dominion on February 4, 1948. By
1972, Sri Lanka would become a full Republic.53 Nepal’s independence,
which had long been recognized by the United Kingdom in a 1923 friendship
treaty, was subsequently recognized by the new Dominion of Pakistan and the
Union of India. Bhutan, which became a politically-autonomous suzerain of
the United Kingdom in 1910, was given the choice of joining the Indian
(ed), Asian States and the Development of International Law (Vikas Publications,
Delhi, India, 1972).
50
Id. at note 9. See Iza Hussin, ‘The Pursuit of Perak Regalia: Islam, Law, and
the Politics of Authority in the Colonial State’ (2007) 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 759784; Sally Engle Merry, ‘Law and Colonialism’ (1991) 25 Law & Soc’y Rev. 889920.
51
See H.S. Bhatia, Origin and Development of Legal and Political System in
India (Deep & Deep Publications, New Delhi, India, 1976); Hamid Khan,
Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan (Oxford University Press, United
Kingdom, 2001).
52
See Francis Robinson, Islam, South Asia and the West (Oxford University
Press, United States, 2008); Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia:
History, Culture, and Political Economy (2nd ed., Routledge, United Kingdom, 2004).
53
See Francis Robinson (ed), The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, and the Maldives (Cambridge University
Press, United Kingdom, 1989).
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Union, but opted for independence. Both the Dominion of Pakistan and the
Union of India would eventually extend recognition to fellow South Asian
states.
Differences on various constitutional questions, (such as the division
of power between central government and the provinces, the sufficiency
representation, and administrative authority) between the majority Islamic
population and the largely-Hindu Bengali population within Pakistan, coupled
with Indian support for the Bengali/Bangladeshi liberation movement, would
provide the impetus for the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in
December 1971. In 1972, Bangladesh would establish its own parliamentary
democracy, and thereafter enter into a friendship treaty with India.54
The terms of the Partition would not sufficiently address competing
territorial claims of India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the northwestern region
of the Indian subcontinent that had its own historic, religious, demographic,
and political linkages with both India and Pakistan. After the United Nations
mediated a ceasefire from the 1947 Indo-Pakistani War, the Security Council
issued Resolution 47 recommending measures to India and Pakistan “to bring
about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and
impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to
accede to India or Pakistan.”55 Such a plebiscite would not be conducted, and
hostilities would resume in 1965 and 1999, the unsatisfactory conclusion of
which resulting in the maintenance of Pakistani control of about a third, and
Indian control of about half, of the disputed territory to date.56
Another vital international legal question arising from the Partition
was the issue of succession of India and Pakistan to treaties to which British
India was a party.57 Pakistan contended that it was a co-successor of India to
all such treaties, especially the 1928 General Act on the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes (1928 Act), through which Pakistan would invoke the jurisdiction of
54

Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose, War and Secession: Pakistan, India, and the
Creation of Bangladesh (University of California Press, California, United States,
1990).
55
UNSC Res 47 (21 April 1948) UN Doc/S/RES/726.
56
See Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights, and the History
of Kashmir (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, United States 2004); H.S.
Gururaja Rao, Legal Aspects of the Kashmir Problem (Minerva Press, New Delhi,
India 2002); Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the
Unending War (I.B. Tauris, London, 2003).
57
Id. at note 46, at 35.
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the International Court of Justice in disputes with India. Pakistan would cite
the 1928 Act to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction in two (2) cases involving
disputes with India, Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India)58
and Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India).59 India took the
view that the 1928 Act was a political treaty that could not be transmitted
automatically to successor States from the Partition. Any confusion on the
succession to the 1928 Act would be eliminated in 1974, when India sent its
written communication to the Secretary General of the United Nations
categorically disavowing any binding effect of the 1928 Act since India’s
independence in 1947.60
Notwithstanding post-independence disputes within the new states of
the region, South Asia would be an active participant and a leading advocate
in the decolonization process and dialogue facilitated by the United Nations,
culminating with the General Assembly’s landmark 1960 Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.61 In 1947,
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru convened the Asian Relations
Conference, which brought together many Asian leaders and reasserted the
end of European imperialism in Asia.62
India under Nehru also led the region’s rejection of the (then
Eurocentric) constitutivist position on recognition of states that had caused
controversy during the colonial period, in favour of a declaratory position that
empowered newly emergent postcolonial states.63 Despite the Eurocentric
genesis of classical positivist international law, however, Nehru would lay a
58

Id. at note 46, at 36. Upon Pakistan’s request, the Court discontinued
proceedings after Pakistan and India reached a negotiated settlement. Trial of
Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India) Order of 15 December 1973, [1973]
ICJ Rep 347.
59
Id. at note 46 at 36-37. Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pakistan v. India)
(Jurisdiction) [2000] ICJ Rep 12.
60
For a concise issue summary on India’s succession to treaties concluded by
British India, see M.K. Nawaz, The Changing Law of Nations: An Indian Focus
(Eastern Law House Ltd., Calcutta, India, 2000), 12-18.
61
UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960). Full text available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm (last visited 20 October 2008). See
also Zoltán Szilágyi, The United Nations’ Role in the Liquidation of Colonialism
(Institute for World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest,
Hungary, 1986), 27-85.
62
RP Anand, Development of Modern International Law and India ((Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden Germany, 2005), 103-104.
63
Id. at note 46, at 38-39.
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policy of Indian acceptance of its norms, with the qualification that normcreation would not be a Euro-American preserve, but rather, a broader process
of development conjoined with the new realities and contingencies of
international life. Nehru’s Panch Sheel (principles of peaceful coexistence),64 initially articulated in a 1954 treaty with China, would resonate
across time to many of South and Southeast Asia’s regional instruments on
international law, most especially the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
of Southeast Asia that laid the foundation for the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 1985 Charter of the South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).65
South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan, would also lead reform
efforts of the international economic system in the 1970s.66 Together with
other Third World countries newly emerging from colonial rule, South Asia
joined in the United Nations General Assembly’s Declaration for the
Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO Declaration),67
which, in the wake of colonialism, ought to be founded on certain principles,
including, among others:
1. sovereign equality of states, self-determination of all peoples,
inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by force, territorial

64

The five principles are: 1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs;
3) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence. RP Anand, Development
of Modern International Law and India (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden,
Germany, 2005), 101-114.
65
Id. at note 18. See Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,
Indonesia, 24 February 1976 (full text available at
http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm, last visited 20 October 2008) [hereafter, TAC];
Charter of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, Bangladesh, 8
December 1985 (full text available at http://www.saarc-sec.org/data/docs/charter.pdf,
last visited 20 October 2008) [hereafter, SAARC Charter].
66
Jagdish Bhagwati (ed), The New International Economic Order: The NorthSouth Debate (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachussetts, United States, 1977);T.S.
Rama Rao, “The New International Economic Order and the North-South Dialogue”
in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M.
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983); R.C. Hingorani, “New International Economic
Order”, in S.K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of
International Law and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M.
Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983).
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integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other
States;
broadest cooperation of all States members of the international
community based on equity;
full and effective participation on the basis of equality of all
countries in solving world economic problems in the common
interest of all countries;
the right of every country to adopt the economic and social
system that it deems most appropriate for its own development;
full permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural
resources and all economic activities, entitling each State to
exercise effective control over them and their exploitation with
means suitable to its own situation, including the right to
nationalization or transfer of ownership to its nationals, this right
being an expression of the full permanent sovereignty of the
State;
the right of all States, territories and peoples under foreign
occupation, alien and colonial domination or apartheid to
restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and
depletion of, and damages to, the natural resources and all other
resources of those States, territories, and peoples;
regulation and supervision of the activities of transnational
corporations;
the right of the developing countries and the peoples of territories
under colonial and racial domination and foreign occupation to
achieve their liberation and to regain effective control over their
natural resources and economic activities;
extending assistance, free of any political or military conditions,
to developing countries, peoples and territories which are under
colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation, racial
discrimination or apartheid, and all forms of neo-colonialism;
just and equitable relationship between the prices of developing
country exports and imports;
promotion of development in the reform of the international
monetary system;
preferential and non-reciprocal treatment for developing countries
in all fields of international economic cooperation; and
developing countries’ access to technology transfers and financial
resources. Alongside the NIEO Declaration, South Asia also
joined in the General Assembly’s adoption of the North-South
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Programme of Action and the Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States.68
Many of the foregoing principles also underlie the nature and scope of
regional cooperation in South Asia. Regional cooperation in South Asia is
facilitated under the SAARC, composed of the seven South Asian states of
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
SAARC heads of state meet annually, or as often as considered necessary by
the member states.69
Policy-making, review of progress of cooperation, decisions on new
areas of cooperation, establishment of additional mechanisms deemed
necessary, and decisions on other matters of general interest to SAARC are
functions assumed by the SAARC Council of Ministers, composed of the
Foreign Ministers of the SAARC member states, and which meets at least biannually.70 Operational functions are discharged by the Standing Committee
(constituted by the foreign secretaries of the SAARC member states) which is
responsible for overall monitoring and coordination of SAARC cooperation
programs;71and the Technical Committees (with representatives from the
SAARC member states) which are responsible for the implementation,
coordination, and monitoring of programmes in their respective areas of
cooperation.72 SAARC has since expanded its areas of cooperation to include
economic and social issues, from tariff reductions and bilateral initiatives for
potential free trade agreements among SAARC members, financial and
monetary issues, to poverty alleviation, the environment, housing, women and
children’s rights, tourism, among others.73
On 4 January 2004, SAARC enacted its Social Charter, which
“consolidate[s] the multifarious commitments of SAARC Member States in
the social sector and provide[s] a practical platform for concerted, coherent,
and complementary action in determining social priorities, improving the
68

UNGA Res 3202 (S-VI) (1974) UN Doc A/RES/S-6/3202; UNGA Res 3281
(XXIX) (1974), UN GAOR 29th Session Supp 31, 50.
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Article III, SAARC Charter.
70
Article IV, SAARC Charter.
71
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Articles V and VI, SAARC Charter.
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Nihal Rodrigo, “SAARC as an institutional framework for cooperation in
South Asia”, in Ramesh Thakur and Oddny Wiggen (trs), South Asia in the World:
Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good
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structure and content of social policies and programmes, ensuring greater
efficiency in the utilization of national, regional and external resources and in
enhancing the equity and sustainability of social programmes and the quality
of living conditions of their beneficiaries.”74 The SAARC Social Charter sets
forth comprehensive socio-economic and development commitments as
binding obligations of SAARC member states, including, among others:
1. “affirm[ing] that the highest priority shall be accorded to the
alleviation of poverty in South Asian Countries”;75
2. “agree[ing] that access to basic education, adequate housing, safe
drinking water and sanitation, and primary health care should be
guaranteed in legislation, executive and administrative provisions,
in addition to ensuring an adequate standard of living, including
adequate shelter, food and clothing”;76
3. “shar[ing] information regarding the outbreak of any
communicable disease” and “agree[ing] to hold prior consultation
on issues [health issues related to livelihood and trade issues
which are influenced by international agreements and
conventions] and to make an effort to arrive at a coordinated
stand on issues that relate to the health of their population;”77
4. various obligations to promote the status of women, prevent their
discrimination and exploitation, and ensure their empowerment
through literacy and education;78
5. extensively-enumerated obligations to promote the rights and
well-being of children;79 and
6. other pressing social issues such as population stabilisation, drug
de-addiction, rehabilitation and reintegration.80
The implementation of the SAARC Social Charter is facilitated by National
Coordination Committees and the SAARC Secretariat, and is mainly left to
member states’ respective domestic institutional competencies to
operationalize the SAARC Social Charter obligations.81
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Preamble, last clause, SAARC Social Charter. Full text available at
http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?id=13 (last visited 20 October 2008).
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Since its inception in 1985, SAARC has remained an
intergovernmental association and has not constituted itself as a formallyintegrated regional organization.82 Its primary focus is on socio-economic
issues, and not on political issues. The first clause of the Preamble to the
SAARC Charter stresses “strict adherence to the principles of the United
Nations Charter and Non-Alignment, particularly respect for the principles of
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of
force, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States and the
peaceful settlement of disputes,” with such principles also reiterated in Article
II of the SAARC Charter.83 Areas of regional cooperation include agriculture,
rural development, telecommunications, meteorology, and health, with
decisions at all levels in the SAARC “taken on the basis of unanimity,” and
with the qualification that “[b]ilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded
from the deliberations of the Association.”84
A South Asian scholar describes these provisions “not as obstacles
but as safeguards to protect the young organization from entanglement in
issues extraneous to regional cooperation. The provisions have been invoked
on many occasions and their applicability in different situations has been
debated at length, both within as well as outside SAARC. The taboo on the
discussion of bilateral issues has helped SAARC to avoid being diverted from
its primary Charter objectives. Yet the spirit of the injunction has not always
been heeded and, when combined with the unanimity provision, this had led
to delays and postponements of ministerial and summit meetings. The
unanimity provision in effect renders to each member of SAARC the power
of a veto.”85
As seen above, SAARC’s limited institutional competencies
purposely do not address conflict resolution in South Asia. In the aftermath
of independence, South Asia has become a theatre for intraregional conflicts
and political tensions:
1. the India-Pakistan conflict on Jammu and Kashmir, which, after
three wars and separate nuclear tests conducted by both states,
remains at a precarious political stalemate;
2. the tenuous political situation in Nepal arising from Maoist
insurgency, which, despite a peace accord reached by the
82
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democratic government and the Maoists in November 2006
providing for the Maoists’ entry into a transitional government
with a view towards United Nations-monitored elections for a
constituent assembly, nevertheless still resulted in the failure of
the peace process, followed by Parliament’s abolition of the
monarchy in December 2007, and in May 28, 2008, Nepal’s
transformation to a federal democratic republic (Maoist Chairman
Pushpa Kamal Dahal Prachanda would be elected the first Prime
Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal on August
15, 2008);
3. unresolved issues of Bhutanese refugees which are potentially
destabilizing to Bhutan and Nepal;
4. separatist insurgencies in northeast India;
5. the continued separatist struggles of the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka; among other security threats
posed by terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human
trafficking, and the spread of HIV/AIDS and other communicable
diseases.
Due to SAARC’s limited mandate, however, conflict resolution
mechanisms in South Asia still depend, for the most part, on informal political
consultations.86 Relatively open and porous borders, conducive to inter-state
migration and movement of refugees, have contributed to the region’s
vulnerability to conflicts.87 The nuclear capabilities of the geographicallyproximate and primary South Asian actors --- India and Pakistan (both of
which are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the
86
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) --- raises the urgency for a South
Asian conflict resolution mechanism or institutional system for settling
bilateral and intraregional disputes.88 Despite bilateral or intraregional
differences, however, South Asia has made substantial contributions to the
United Nations’ own peacekeeping operations, and other international
initiatives to maintain international peace and security.89
South Asia has also made innumerable contributions to the
development of the law of the sea. As described by one scholar, “...all the
newly-independent South Asian states, in tune with the times, have tried to
take the maximum benefit of the current turmoil in the [law of the sea to]
extend their national jurisdictions.”90 India’s 1976 Maritime Zones Act
demarcated its territorial sea to twelve nautical miles (nm); its contiguous
zone limit to twenty-four nm for purposes of security, immigration, sanitation,
customs, and other fiscal matters; and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to two
hundred nm. With India’s central position in the Indian Ocean (having a
continental coastline of about 5700 kilometers, 1200 islands and islets, and
traversing many crucial international maritime routes, about 131, 800 sq.nm.
of continental shelf and margin), India also added many prime maritime
routes and areas to its sovereign jurisdiction. India’s maritime claims would
fall well-within the framework of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea, with India gaining about 587,600 sq.nm as part of its EEZ. India is also
recognized as a ‘pioneer investor’ in seabed exploratory activities for the
recovery of polymetallic nodules from the ocean.
On the other hand, Pakistan has not yet fully demarcated its maritime
boundary with India, particularly with respect to the Rann of Kutch, about
90% of which had been awarded to India by an international arbitral tribunal.
88
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Sri Lankan proposals for the limited expansion of its continental shelf, in view
of the special characteristics of its continental margin, were admitted in the
1982 UNCLOS Convention (Sri Lanka was permitted to establish the outer
edge of its continental fixed points defined by latitude and longitude, at each
of which the thickness of sedimentary rock was not less than one kilometre.)
Sri Lanka and India completed their boundary delimitations in 1977; however,
both states claim the Palk Strait, Palk Bay, and the Gulf of Manaar as part of
each state’s historic waters.91
Following the enactment of its 1974 Territorial Waters and Maritime
Zones Act, Bangladesh has also had serious delimitation disputes with India
about their overlapping maritime boundaries. In view of Bangladesh’s
specific geomorphological considerations (e.g. “the estuary of Bangladesh is
such that no stable water line or demarcation of landward and seaward area
exists”; “the continual process of alluvian and sedimentation forms mud
banks, and the area is so shallow as to be non-navigable by other than small
boats”; “the navigable channels through the aforesaid banks are continuously
changing their course and require soundings to establish their demarcation”),
Bangladesh proposed an amendment to Article 4 of the Territorial Sea
Convention to delineate baselines using the depth method for establishing
baselines, instead of the ‘normal baselines’ or ‘straight baselines’ standards in
the law of the sea. The amendment was not accepted, but Article 7(2) of the
1982 Convention attempted to meet the situation.92
Other maritime disputes between Bangladesh and India involve the
1970 formation of a new island in the Bay of Bengal (known as New Moore
Island or Purbasha in India and South Talpatty island in Bangladesh),
boundaries with Andaman and Nicobar Islands, the sharing of river waters,
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the construction of the Farakka barrage, and the exchange of small land
enclaves on the Indo-Bangladesh border, among others.93
Other South Asian states have also negotiated (or are in the process of
negotiating) maritime boundaries. Maldives concluded its agreements with
India and Sri Lanka in 1976, but has an unusual claim based on its 1964
Constitution which defined the territory of Maldives as “the islands, air and
sea surrounding and in between the islands contained within a rectangle
formed by meridians and parallels.”94 (The EEZ claim around the Maldives’
constitutional rectangle has not been recognized thus far.) Nepal and Bhutan,
both landlocked States dependent on coastal states such as India for transit
passage, are constrained to rely on Article 69 of UNCLOS to “participate, on
an equitable basis, in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of
the living resources of the EEZs of the coastal States of the same sub-region
or region.”95
South Asia has also staunchly advocated the development of
international environmental law and outer space law.96 India actively
participated in the 1972 Stockholm Conference, and thereafter enacted
amendments to its Constitution as well as parliamentary legislation in order to
give effect to many commitments articulated in the Stockholm Declaration
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and the UN General Assembly’s Resolution 2977 (XXVII) in 1972.97 Within
a broad spectrum of international environmental issues and concerns, South
Asia has been particularly vocal in its support for the establishment of
international cooperation for ensuring sustainable development practices and
technology transfers, environmental compensation and/or financial assistance,
and fundamental international environmental law principles such as the
prohibition against transboundary harms, the precautionary principle, the
polluter-pays principle, intergenerational equity, and sustainable
development.98
To provide a regional institutional cooperative response to problems
of environmental degradation, common resource management, and joint
initiatives on environment and development, South Asian states established an
inter-governmental programme, the South Asian Cooperative Environment
Programme (SACEP) in 1982.99 With respect to outer space law, India’s
space policies, activities, and institutions demonstrate strong and continued
participation in the implementation and/or further interpretive development of
multilateral treaties (such as the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1968 Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space; the 1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space; and the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies) and resolutions of the United
Nations General Assembly with normative content for regulating space
activities (such as, among others, the 1982 Principles Governing the Use by
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television
Broadcasting; the 1986 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth
from Outer Space; the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power
Sources in Outer Space; and the 1996 Declaration on International
97

See A. David Ambrose, “International Environmental Law and India”, in
Bimal N. Patel (ed), India and International Law (Brill Academic Publishers,
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the Netherlands, 2005).
98
Id. at note 97. See Alexander J. Bolla and Ted L. McDorman (trs),
Comparative Asian Environmental Law Anthology (Carolina Academic Press,
Durham, North Carolina, United States, 1999); Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, Thomas
A. Mensah, and Bernard H. Oxman (trs), Sustainable Development and the
Preservation of the Oceans: The Challenges of UNCLOS and Agenda 21 (Law of the
Sea Institute, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, Honolulu,
1997).
99
See http://www.sacep.org/html/about_overview.htm (last visited 20 October
2008).
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Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in
the Interest of All States).100
South Asia’s multidirectional engagement of, and contributions to the
development of, modern international law has inspired concomitant proposals
for teaching methodologies and curricular content of international law in
South Asian law schools. Concrete suggestions were advanced on how to
reorient international law teaching and curriculum in the region:
1. viewing international law “sociologically, as a device of building
community institutions by the development of consensus, the
search for common interests and the management of conflicts --at the same time satisfying the normal complementary legal needs
of stability of expectations and the requirements of change”;
2. developing interdisciplinary skills, or for international law
professors to “become specialists in some aspects of international
law” and encouraging specialized monographic writings and
empirical studies;
3. the redistribution of the current content of international law
courses to ensure exposure to aspects of international law as
would “sharpen thought and analysis in traditional legal courses”,
and “help institutionalize awareness of relatedness of
international and legal developments”;101 and accordingly,
4. the restructuring of law degrees to reflect the proposed curricular
revisions.102
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C. Jayaraj, “The Law of Outer Space and India” in Bimal N. Patel (ed), India
and International Law (Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, the
Netherlands, 2005); J.N. Singh, Outer Space, Outer Sea, Outer Land and
International Law (Harnam, New Delhi, 1987); P.P.C. Haanappel, The Law and
Policy of Air Space and Outer Space: A Comparative Approach (Kluwer Law
International, the Hague, New York, 2003).
101
Upendra Baxi, “Teaching of International Law in India in 2000 A.D. – Some
Non-Utopian Proposals”, in .K. Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New
Horizons of International Law and Developing Countries (International Law
Association, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd., India, 1983). See also M.K. Nawaz, “On the
Ways and Means of Improving Research of International Law in India”, in ”, in .K.
Agrawala, T.S. Rama Rao, and J.N. Saxena (trs), New Horizons of International Law
and Developing Countries (International Law Association, N.M. Tripathi Private Ltd.,
India, 1983).
102
Kl Vibhute, ‘International Law in India – Developing Curricula and Teaching:
Some Reflections’ (2001) 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 388-404.
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Thus, while early postcolonial international law scholarship in South
Asia proved valuable in “indict[ing] colonial international law for legitimizing
the subjugation and oppression of Asian peoples”; “emphasiz[ing] that Asian
states were not strangers to the idea of international law”; “argu[ing] that
there was nothing in the cultural traditions of Asian peoples that prevented
them from participating fully in the contemporary international legal process;”
and advocating “reform, rather than repudiation” of international law towards
its expansion, postmodern South Asian international law scholarship
highlights the failure to see neo-colonial structures in international law and
institutions of the international legal order, as well as the conceptual defects
of inordinately relying on positivist methodology in the teaching and research
of international law.103 Measures proposed to respond to these concerns
include, among others:
1. recognition that international law now seeks to “displace
municipal law in regulating core aspects of sovereign economic
and political space”;
2. expansion of the normative content of international law taking
into account the discursive influences of non-state actors and
gender;
3. scaling back on ‘overspecialization’ that leads to fragmentation
and under-theorization of international law; and
4. dissecting the decision-making processes of international
institutions, imposing duties on international property holders
such as transnational/multinational corporations, and revealing
the underlying themes of dominance and power in sustainable
development and human rights discourse.
Southeast Asia and International Law
In contrast to South Asia, the ten (10) countries comprising the
Southeast Asian region (Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar)
have had a relatively shorter (documented) history of regional engagement
towards the development of contemporary international law. While there
were about forty kingdoms, principalities, and sultanates spread across
Southeast Asia in antiquity, paradigms of statehood were hardly uniform.104
Neither were Southeast Asian states identifiable with homogenous or closely
103

BS Chimni, ‘Teaching, Research, and Promotion of International Law in
India: Past, Present, and Future’ (2001) 5 Sing. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 368-387.
104
See Amry Vandenbosch, ‘Regionalism in Southeast Asia’ (1946) The Far
Eastern Quarterly, Volume 5, No. 4, 427-438.
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similar cultural polities, as had been the case in the predominantly Indocentric South Asia.
Early modern Southeast Asian states were roughly classifiable into
agrarian/mainland societies (such as those that preceded Burma, Vietnam, and
Cambodia, and whose governance structures were characterized by
centralized official hierarchies and semi-divine kings), and sea-based or
archipelagic kingdoms (those that preceded Sumatra, Malaya, North Java,
Brunei in North Borneo were governed by ‘aristocratic elites’ that controlled
the trading fleet).105 Modernity (if taken in its broader eclectic acceptation and
not exclusively from the lens of pure Eurocentrism) was also apparent from
these ‘early modern’ (pre-colonial) Southeast Asian states.106
Mainland societies among the pre-colonial/ancient Southeast Asian
states shared the following major structural, political, and cultural
convergences:
1. some form of territorial consolidation among agrarian or seabased polities, which made the early modern empires (such as the
Burmese, Thai and Vietnamese empires in c. 1100- c.1250)
“more effectively integrated both administratively and culturally
than their classical antecedents”, and with such imperial
consolidations “exhibit[ing] a common structure and rhythm
heavily influenced by the mainland’s north-south segmentation”,
since the empires “centered initially on one of the major northsouth corridors, which were particularly favoured in their
agricultural/geographic resources and/or in their access to
maritime trade: the Irrawaddy basin of Burma, the Chaophraya
basin of Thailand, and the Song-koi basin and associated coastal
districts of what is now north and central Vietnam”;
2. administrative centralization from the mainland that “facilitated
and accompanied territorial consolidation”;
3. political integration in these early modern empires that “both
encouraged and mirrored a long-term tendency, naturally more
pronounced in the central lowlands than in upland areas or in
105

M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of Southeast Asia (Oxford University
Press, Oxford, New York, 1978); see also Nicholas Tarling (ed), The Cambridge
History of Southeast Asia: From early times to c. 1500 (Cambridge University Press,
United Kingdom, 1999).
106
Barbara Watson Andaya, “Historicising ‘Modernity’ in Southeast Asia”
(1997) Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Volume 40, No. 4,
391-409.
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distant vassal states, towards the acceptance of centrally-defined
norms”; and
4. as religious/cultic practices and styles of imperial capitals set
standards for local elites, “capital cultures adhered more closely
to orthodox, textually-derived religious/cultic norms,” so much so
that, for example, Burmese, Thai, Lao, Shan, and Cambodian
courts would move “towards more self-consciously Theravada
Buddhist modes of ceremonial, literary, legal, and monastic
expression.”
A similar pattern would appear from the neo-Confucian revolution in Vietnam
that accelerated or initiated “a trend towards the adoption of Chinese models
of ritual, scholarship, law and literature.”107
On the other hand, the pattern of political and cultural integration of
archipelagic/sea-based Southeast Asian societies (present-day Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei, Indonesia, and the Philippines) has been characterized by:
1. the dramatic penetration of new religious systems (Islam and
Christianity) that “segment[ed] a more or less fluid Southeast
Asian cultural matrix into four mutually-exclusive zones [NeoConfucianism, orthodox Theravada Buddhism, Islam and
Christianity] that endure, with various permutations, to the
present”;
2. fragmented and decentralized indigenous polities whose evolution
was more susceptible to the influences of maritime commerce;
and
3. apart from “novel religious expressions and circumscribed
movements of territorial consolidation,” other stimuli to longterm integration would be similar as those that factored in the
political-cultural integration of mainland Southeast Asian
societies (e.g. growing maritime trade; the legitimizing prestige of
imported religious systems; the centralizing potential of firearms;
and the imperative of interstate competition).108
Early modern Southeast Asian law would thus emerge from the heavy
normative influence and infusion of Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese legal

107

See Victor Lieberman, ‘Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies:
Structuring Southeast Asian History, c. 1350 – c. 1830’, (1993) Modern Asian
Studies, Volume 27, No. 3, 475-572.
108
Id. at note 105. See also Craig J. Reynolds, ‘A New Look at Old Southeast
Asia’ (1995) The Journal of Asian Studies, Volume 54, No. 2, 419-446.
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traditions.109 For Burma, Siam, Champa and Khmer, Hindu law provided rules
on moral and social conduct traceable to the Code of Manu which “codified
law in ten categories and solved disputes through collective decision-making
(mushawara-mufakat), a process that remains one of the most important
techniques of handling administrative affairs in modern Javanese society.” 110
Buddhist kingdoms in Burma, Thailand, and Laos drew from Buddhist texts
providing ethical rules of conduct through theistically-driven conceptions of
obligation, as seen in the legal traditions contained in Burma’s Dhammathat
and Thailand’s Dhammasattham. Ancient societies in Indonesia, Malaysia,
and southern Philippines, and Brunei were governed by Islamic law,
principally through the interrelated structures of the Koran and the Shariah.
Chinese legal traditions that extended to Vietnam drew from the teachings of
Confucianism.111
Forms of Southeast Asian law would include:
1. written texts (Oriental laws that were Indian-derived, Islamic, or
Chinese-derived; as well as Occidental laws from English,
French, Dutch, and Spanish-American laws);
2. oral law (such as the “Burmese law tales, the Minangkabau
perbilangan”, the Malay/Javanese wayang and the Thai nang
talung);
3. law in social institutions (normative systems in the Indonesian
adat, Malaya, Ifugao, and the Bahnar code); and
4. indigenous adaptations (the attempt “to make sense of the formal
system in what is still largely a peasant world by adapting forms
derived from the formal state system”).
Southeast Asian law’s “striking feature” would be its legal pluralism, where
“status laws have been subsumed under or absorbed into the categories and
processes of the introduced municipal law so as to produce a body of hybrid
rules and principles.112
109

M.B. Hooker, Laws of Southeast Asia: Volumes 1 and 2 (Butterworth Legal
Publishers, Singapore, 1986-1988).
110
Graham Hassall and Cheryl Saunders, Asia-Pacific Constitutional Systems
(Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 2002) 14-17.
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See Tony Day and Craig J. Reynolds, ‘Cosmologies, Truth Regimes, and the
State in Southeast Asia’ (2000) Modern Asian Studies, Volume 34, No. 1, 1-55.
112
M.B. Hooker, A Concise Legal History of Southeast Asia (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1978), 1-14, at 9: “The Southeast Asian legal world is thus a world of
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Relatively recent histories on Southeast Asian encounters with
modernity take up the themes of:
1. the “reconstruction of Southeast Asian historical time through its
history and biography”;
2. a deeper interrogation of “the dynamic interplay of colonial and
local knowledge; the inventions of tradition, and the contested
modernity within each”; and
3. the recognition that the “rediscovery of colonial history is also a
re-examination of the nation.”113
These themes explain how the complex process of entrenchment of EuroAmerican colonial powers (France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United States) from the seventeenth (17th) to the
nineteenth (19th) centuries would bear pervasive effects on Southeast Asian
legal structures: “[i]n each colony, doctrines evolved to govern the new mix
of Western and traditional law, and by the end of the colonial era, the forty
states in Southeast Asia had shrunk to approximately ten.”114
Colonial authorities tended to delegate (some) administrative powers
to the “co-opted local rulers”, transforming legal frameworks towards unequal
relationships: “[m]atters of personal status were generally left in the realm of
customary law, although individual rights and freedoms were considerably
restrained by legal regimes designed to control and monitor rather than
liberate and foster. Different laws applied to the indigenous population and
the Europeans, and the unequal nature of these relationships planted the seeds
of aspirations towards autonomy, nationalism and independence.”115

law, accommodations did take place.” See Richard A. Gard, ‘Ideological Problems in
Southeast Asia’ (1953) Philosophy East and West, Volume 2, No. 4, 292-307.
113
T.N. Harper, ‘Asian Values and Southeast Asian Histories’ (1997) The
Historical Journal, Volume 40, No. 2, 507-517. See also G. Carter Bentley,
‘Indigenous States of Southeast Asia’ (1986) Annual Review of Anthropology,
Volume 15, 275-305.
114
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lease relationship with China covering Macau; British colonies in Penang, Singapore,
the Malay states, British Borneo and Burma, with a lease relationship with China
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The common ‘hybridity’ of Southeast Asian legal systems (e.g. EuroAmerican legal conceptions existing alongside indigenous normative systems
stretching back to ancient Hindu, Islamic, and Chinese legal traditions), and
the consequent diversity of their ideological bases, would presage Southeast
Asia’s transformation into a critical theatre for Cold War tensions.116 While
newly-independent Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia would join South
Asian countries (such as India) in strongly advocating the 1955 Bandung
Conference’s Declaration of Principles, Southeast Asian states differed in the
political basis and vision for implementing the Bandung principles. A scholar
starkly describes how ten years after the Bandung Conference, Southeast Asia
was on the precipice of open intra-regional hostilities:
Indonesia, under President Sukarno and Foreign Minister
Subandrio, was outwardly very powerful, especially within the NonAligned Group, and was flirting with the Socialist countries. The PKI
(Partai Komunis Indonesia) was the largest Communist party in the
world outside of the USSR. An axis was formed linking together
Pyong Yang (North Korea), Peking (China), Hanoi (North Vietnam),
Phnom Penh (Cambodia), and Jakarta (Indonesia). At this juncture,
the United Kingdom...decided to create Malaysia by adding the
territories of Sarawak and Sabah to the Federation of Malaya.
Malaysia was born as an extension of an existing state. Sukarno was
not pleased with Greater Malaysia. As if to add insult to injury, the
United Nations not only recognized Malaysia as successor State to the
Malay Federation but also the new State was elected member to the
Security Council. Subandrio adopted the policy of Konfrontasi or
‘Confrontation Against Malaysia’. Before the latter took its seat in
the Security Council, Indonesia withdrew from the United Nations
altogether and intensified her ‘Confrontation’ policy, opposing
Malaysia’s admission to the Asian-African Conference in Algeria.
Paratroopers were dropped inside Malaysian territory in Sarawak and
Malacca, and there were sporadic disturbances in Singapore. xxx The
Philippines also protested against the addition of Sabah to Malaysia
as it had a long-standing claim traceable to the Sultanate of Sulu. The
discord between the Philippines and Malaysia disrupted the progress
of the ASA [Association of Southeast Asia] which during this critical
period continued to subsist in a state of suspended animation.”117
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See Paul Kelemen, ‘Southeast Asia Between the Superpowers’ (1981)
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Initial attempts at regional organization in Southeast Asia thus proved
short-lived and ineffectual in resolving the security tensions arising from the
Konfrontasi as well as related separatism issues within the region.118 The
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), formed in 1954 under the
influence of the United States (with the participation of Australia, Britain,
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and the United
States), was “more accurately described as part of the worldwide US-led
system of anti-Communist military alliances, or security arrangements, than
as a true Southeast Asian regional arrangement.” The Asian and Pacific
Council (ASPAC), organized at the initiative of South Korea’s President Park
Chung-hee in 1966, only had four Southeast Asian states as its members
(Malaysia, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand), but it collapsed
after seven years due to contradictory and/or conflicting objectives of being
“non-military, non-ideological, and not anti-Communist” while resolved to
“preserve their integrity and sovereignty in the face of external threats.”
From 1959-1961, then Prime Minister of Malaya Tunku Abdul
Rahman would spearhead the creation of the Association of Southeast Asia
(ASA) (composed only of then Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand),but this
organization would suffer from hostilities between the Philippines and Malaya
over the latter’s formation of the Federation of Malaysia, which included
Philippine claims to Sabah. A similar fate would befall the MalaysiaPhilippines-Indonesia Association (MAPHILINDO), established in 1963, but
would become wholly ineffective upon the refusal of Indonesia and the
Philippines to recognize the new Federation of Malaysia, and Indonesia’s
subsequent guerrilla war against Malaysia (the Konfrontasi) that lasted until
1967. 119
The regional political landscape would irrevocably change with the
formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand formed
ASEAN through constitutive instruments such as the 1967 ASEAN
(Bangkok) Declaration and the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)
See Nicholas Tarling, Regionalism in Southeast Asia: To Foster the Political Will
(Routledge, United Kingdom, 2006).
118
See David Brown, ‘From Peripheral Communities to Ethnic Nations:
Separatism in Southeast Asia’ (1988) Pacific Affairs, Volume 61, No. 1, 51-77;
Vincent K. Pollard, ‘ASA and ASEAN, 1961-1967: Southeast Asian Regionalism’
(1970) Asian Survey, Volume 10, No.3, 244-255.
119
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in Southeast Asia.120 Since 1967, ASEAN expanded its current membership
to ten, including Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and
Cambodia. Under the terms of the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN was
constituted as simply an “association for regional cooperation”, with the
following core developmental and security objectives:
1. “accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit
of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation
for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian
Nations”;
2. “promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of
the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations
Charter”;
3. “promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of
common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical,
scientific and administrative fields”;
4. “provide assistance to each other in the form of training and
research facilities in the educational, professional, technical, and
administrative spheres”;
5. “collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their
agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including
the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the
improvement of their transportation and communications
facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples”;
6. “promote Southeast Asian studies”; and
7. “maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing
international and regional organizations with similar aims and
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation
among themselves.”
To achieve these cooperative aims, the TAC strictly enjoins ASEAN member
States to observe the fundamental principles of mutual respect for the
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity
of the respective member states; freedom from external interference,
subversion, or coercion; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and
peaceful settlement of disputes.121
120
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As a regional organization, ASEAN’s largest success to date has been
the containment and/or prevention of intra-regional conflicts among its
member States --- success largely attributed to its cooperative orientation (the
“ASEAN Way”) through processes of consultation, negotiation, and
consensus (mushawara and mufakat). In the early years since its formation,
ASEAN was “strictly a sub-regional organization of the free-market noncommunist states of the region --- Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the
Philippines, and Thailand, with the addition of Brunei in 1984. The
Communist Indochina states were excluded and contested ASEAN’s right to
shape regional order in a way that was manifest over the Cambodian issue.
Second, ASEAN security perspectives were based upon Cold War realities
that for Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore included a reliance upon a
US military presence in the region.
The nonaligned countries of ASEAN, Indonesia and Malaysia,
formulated a basis for decoupling the region from superpower rivalry: the
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) or the Kuala Lumpur
Declaration of November 1971.”122 As a regional cooperation, ASEAN has
operated under a highly decentralized structure, establishing key institutions
for its various fields of cooperation.123 As initially envisioned by ASEAN’s
founding members, ASEAN has promoted constructive political dialogue over
the last four decades that has prevented the escalation of political tensions into
armed conflict between ASEAN countries. In 1994, ASEAN established the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which facilitates cooperation on political
and security matters through confidence-building, “preventive diplomacy,”
and constructive dialogue with ASEAN political partners.124 (Participants to
the ARF include Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China,
European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Republic of Korea,
Republic of Korea (ROK), Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New
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Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Russian
Federation, Singapore, Thailand, the United States, and Viet Nam.)
Issues foremost on the ARF’s agenda are nuclear non-proliferation,125
counter-terrorism, territorial disputes,126 and transnational crime.127 Finally,
consistent with the “ASEAN Vision 2020” (which articulates member States’
long-term objectives for the ASEAN)128 regional cooperation is facilitated
through three “communities:” the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN
Economic Community (which provides the venue for cooperation and
dialogue in relation to the ASEAN Free Trade Area),129 and the ASEAN
Socio-Cultural Community.
After over forty years as an association for regional cooperation,
ASEAN is poised to move towards greater regional integration, this time as a
formal international organization with the ability to make decisions binding
and enforceable upon all ASEAN member States. On November 20, 2007, all
ten (10) ASEAN countries signed the Singapore Declaration on the ASEAN
Charter, stating their resolve to “complete ratification by all Member
Countries as soon as possible in order to bring the ASEAN Charter into
force”.130
The signing of the Singapore Declaration followed swiftly after the
ASEAN countries issued the 13 January 2007 Cebu Declaration on the
125
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Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, noting that “ASEAN has matured into a
regional organisation and is expanding its role as an integrated regional
economy and a dynamic force in maintaining regional peace and stability as
envisaged in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II) and its
plans of action, roadmaps, and the ASEAN Vision 2020 which envisions
ASEAN as a concert of Southeast Asian nations, outward-looking, living in
peace, stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic
development and in a community of caring societies.”131 The move from
regional cooperation to integration appears to have been largely motivated by
Southeast Asia’s economic development over the last forty years within the
framework of ASEAN cooperation.
As of April 2008, total ASEAN population stands at over 575 million,
with an annual population growth of almost 2%. Overall GDP for the
ASEAN region is now about US $1.3 trillion per annum, under a 6.5% growth
rate per annum. Total annual inter-ASEAN trade is at over US $354 billion
per annum, with a 14.7% growth rate in nominal value of total trade. Total
annual ASEAN trade with non-ASEAN countries (including other regional
economic groupings) is nearly US$ 1.1 trillion per annum, accounting for
74.9% of ASEAN countries’ total trade volumes.132 To date, seven (7) out of
the ten (10) ASEAN countries have completed their respective domestic
ratification processes on the ASEAN Charter: Singapore, Brunei Darussalam,
Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. The ASEAN Charter will enter into
force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the tenth instrument
of ratification with the ASEAN Secretary-General.133
At the time of its creation, ASEAN’s international legal personality
was thus “relative” or “subjective”,134 being attributable to the express
recognition of its member States under the framework of the TAC and the
Bangkok Declaration. ASEAN actions under its cooperative framework are
generally undertaken through a consensus-building process, which has
subjected ASEAN to international observers’ criticisms of organizational
impotence against human rights violations of ASEAN member countries,
most recently Myanmar. Against these criticisms, however, ASEAN has
stood by its policy of ‘constructive engagement’ and ‘preventive diplomacy’
131
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to encourage members to embrace democratic principles and widen
democratic spaces.135
The signing and ongoing ratification process of the ASEAN Charter
institutionalizes ASEAN’s Vision 2020. In 1997, ASEAN member countries
anchored ASEAN Vision 2020 on two (2) platforms: 1) closer economic
integration with the free flow of goods, capital, services, and investments
among ASEAN countries; and 2) an increasingly unified ASEAN identity
under institutions that promote ASEAN regional political, social, and security
interests towards compliance with the international legal order.136 Pursuant to
this vision, ASEAN leaders resolved in 2003 to facilitate creation of the
ASEAN Community through three “pillar communities”: the ASEAN
Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community (which provides the
venue for cooperation and dialogue in relation to the ASEAN Free Trade
Area),137 and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
The ASEAN Charter, however, marks a distinct culmination of the
forty-year cooperative relationship between the ASEAN member countries.
As stressed by Philippine Ambassador Rosario Manalo, the Chairperson of
the High-Level Task Group that drafted the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN would
be transformed from a regional cooperation to a “rules-based organization
with legal personality”, which could “sue and be sued”.138 Briefly, the
important features of the ASEAN Charter are the following:
• Conferral of Legal Personality on ASEAN;139

135

“ASEAN to Pursue Constructive Engagement With Myanmar after Power
Struggle”, October 25, 2004, at http://www.aseansec.org/afp/78.htm (last visited 28
May 2008).
136
Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (last visited 18 August 2007).
137
Hanoi Plan of Action, Hanoi, Vietnam, 15 December 1988. Full text at:
http://www.aseansec.org/687.htm (last visited 18 August 2007); Agreement on the
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade
Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992. Full text at: http://www.aseansec.org/1164.htm
(last visited 18 August 2007); Protocol to Amend the Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Thailand, 15 December 1995. Full text
at: http://www.aseansec.org/2083.htm (last visited 18 August 2007).
138
“Draft ASEAN Charter calls for human rights body, upholds noninterference
policy”, The Associated Press, November 8, 2007, at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/09/asia/AS-GEN-ASEAN-Charter.php (last
visited 28 May 2008).
139
ASEAN Charter, Chapter II, Article 3.
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Expansion of Organizational Purposes to include Strengthening
Democracy, Promoting Rule of Law, and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;140
General Obligation of ASEAN member States to abide by
Organizational Principles such as “adherence to the rule of law,
good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional
government”, as well as “respect for fundamental freedoms, the
promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of
social justice”;141
General Obligation of ASEAN member States to abide by
Organizational Principles that affirm adherence to rules of the
international legal order, such as “the United Nations Charter and
international law, including international humanitarian law”, the
principle of non-intervention, and all multilateral trade rules,
emphasizing “respect for the different cultures, languages, and
religions of peoples of the ASEAN” given their “common values
in the spirit of unity in diversity”;142
Organizational structure and institutions with the following key
powers and functions:
1. ASEAN Summit143 (composed of the Heads of State of the
Member States), which functions as the “supreme policymaking body of ASEAN”, with powers to “deliberate,
provide policy guidance and take decisions on key issues
pertaining to the realization of ASEAN objectives”, including
“taking appropriate actions” in “emergency situations”.
While decision-making remains primarily based on
consultation and consensus, if consensus cannot be achieved,
the ASEAN Summit may “decide how a specific decision can
be made”. The ASEAN Summit shall also decide over
serious breaches of the ASEAN Charter.
2. ASEAN Coordinating Council144 (composed of Foreign
Ministers of the Member States), which coordinates the
implementation of agreements and decisions of the ASEAN
Summit.

ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 1(7).
ASEAN Charter, Chapter 1, Articles 2(2h) and 2(2i).
142
ASEAN Charter, Chapter 1, Articles 2(2j), 2(2k), 2(2l), 2(2m), 2(2n).
143
ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 7, and Chapter VII, Article 20.
144
ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 8.
141
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3. ASEAN Community Councils145 (composed of the ASEAN
Political –Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic
Community Council, and ASEAN Socio-Cultural
Community Council), which continues the work of the
ASEAN pillar communities and submits recommendations
and reports to the ASEAN Summit for decision.
4. ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, the ASEAN SecretaryGeneral, the ASEAN Secretariat, Committee of Permanent
Representatives, National Secretariats, and the ASEAN
Foundation,146 which collectively coordinate report gathering
throughout ASEAN’s operational functions, for formulation
of recommendations for ASEAN policy making.
5. ASEAN Human Rights Body,147 an institution established in
‘conformity with the purposes and principles of the ASEAN
Charter relating to the protection and promotion of human
rights’, and whose terms of reference are still to be
determined at the next ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting.
Specific Obligations of ASEAN Member States to “take all
necessary measures, including the enactment of appropriate
domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of
the Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership”,
and to peacefully resolve and settle disputes pursuant to the
ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms, without prejudice to
future recourse to dispute settlement mechanisms to which
ASEAN Member States are parties.148

The passage of the ASEAN Charter (and its ongoing ratification
process) signals three important developments for the integration of the
Southeast Asian region:
1. a region-wide commitment to international law, or the rules of the
international public order;
2. institutional and Member-State accountability as a platform for
compliance; and
3. respect for political pluralism under a common conception of
shared values.

145

ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 9.
ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Articles 10, 11, 12, 13, 15.
147
ASEAN Charter, Chapter IV, Article 14.
148
ASEAN Charter, Chapter III, Article 5(2), Chapter VIII, Articles 23-28.
146
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When all ASEAN member countries signed the ASEAN Charter
without qualification, they likewise undertook not to take any action that
would ‘defeat the object and purposes’ of the Charter.149 ASEAN Member
States whose ratification of the ASEAN Charter remains pending (e.g. the
Philippines, Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia) should therefore be seen as just
as bound as other Member States who have ratified the Charter (e.g.
Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia) to observe the key
ASEAN Organizational Purposes of ‘strengthening democracy, promoting
rule of law, and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms’, along
with the United Nations Charter, international law, international humanitarian
law.
This region-wide commitment builds on a forty-year history of
independent practice and/or opinio juris on universal human rights norms by
Southeast Asian states. The majority, if not all of its member States, have in
recent years either signed, ratified, or acceded to the fundamental treaties and
conventions codifying the ‘core’ human rights norms on civil and political
rights and the jus cogens prohibitions against torture, crimes against
humanity, slavery, genocide, racial discrimination, and other egregious human
rights violations.150 Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and the Philippines, have
already ratified the Apartheid Convention. All ASEAN member States have
ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam
have all ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD). Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
and Vietnam have likewise ratified the Genocide Convention. The ICCPR
has been ratified by Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Vietnam.
In the last decade, the Torture Convention has been ratified by
Indonesia and the Philippines. The strong cultural relativist positions of
some ASEAN Member States (such as Singapore and Malaysia in 1993
during the Vienna Conference on Human Rights) could thus be deemed to
have been rendered obsolete by the ASEAN Member States’ own practice
(albeit imperfect), treaty ratification record, and the passage of the ASEAN
Charter. Indeed, even the Vienna Declaration which explicitly rejected
149

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18(1).
See http://www.unhcr.org (last visited 18 August 2007) for the status of
ASEAN member states’ signatures, ratifications, accessions to the ‘core’ human
rights treaties on civil and political rights.
150
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cultural exceptionalism to observance of human rights, was passed with the
affirmative votes of the very same Asian states that registered cultural
relativist objections.151 The same degree of commitment extends to abiding
by multilateral trading rules.
Prior to the passage of the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Member States
had to conduct their own national review, analysis, and monitoring to
ascertain compliance with the rules of origin and the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme, with no legally binding authority to
resolve disputes among ASEAN members.152 ASEAN members have agreed
to uniformly impose zero tariffs on generally all imports between ASEAN
members by 2010 (2015 for Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam). With
the signing of the ASEAN Charter, all Member States have assumed the
obligation not to defeat its purposes, one of which is adherence to multilateral
trading rules. This implies that ASEAN Member States’ national
implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area rules (pending entry into
force of the ASEAN Charter and the activation of its institutions of
governance) should still strictly comply with all multilateral trading rules.
There should be little doubt that ASEAN and its Member States are bound
and committed to the rules of international public order. Exceptionalist
positions have been substantially eroded with the signing (and impending
entry into force) of the ASEAN Charter.
The crux of international criticism against ASEAN prior to the
passage of the ASEAN Charter was its organizational ‘ineffectiveness’ due to
the consensus-requirement for decision-making. ASEAN’s “silences” and
“omissions” in recognition and enforcement of international human rights
norms on civil and political rights have been attributed to the difficulty of
achieving a consensus, and ASEAN’s strong emphasis on the fundamental

151

See Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 5, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/23. Full text at: http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/vienna.htm (last
visited 23 August 2007); UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,
Articles 2, 4, and 5.
152
Under the CEPT scheme, the ASEAN Free Trade Area does not apply a
common external tariff on imported goods. ASEAN members can apply a tariff rate
of 0 to 5 percent on goods originating within ASEAN, while they can impose tariffs
based on their national schedules for goods entering outside of ASEAN. Exclusions
from the CEPT scheme are optional upon ASEAN members for temporary
exclusions, sensitive agricultural products, and some general exceptions. See
http://www.aseansec.org (last visited 28 May 2008).
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principles of sovereignty and non-interference.153 The ASEAN Charter
departs from ASEAN’s present voluntarist model of international personality
by expressly conferring ASEAN with “legal personality” as an “intergovernmental organization”,154 and enjoying functional immunities and
privileges “necessary for the fulfilment of [the] purposes”155 of the
organization.
The hortatory provisions in the Preamble of the ASEAN Charter
widen ASEAN’s orientation from political-economic cooperation towards
“adherence to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good
governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms”.156 Thus, while the ASEAN Charter affirms the fundamental
principles in the TAC, the Bangkok Declaration, and other treaties,
declarations, agreements, and international instruments annexed to the
Charter, the ASEAN Charter introduces a novel clause by making “respect for
fundamental freedoms, the promotion and protection of human rights, and the
promotion of social justice”,157 and “adherence to the rule of law, good
governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional government”158
key principles to govern the conduct of ASEAN and its member States.
In relation to these broader purposes and principles of conduct,
member States are expressly obligated to “take all necessary measures to
effectively comply with all obligations, including the enactment of
appropriate domestic legislation, to effectively implement the provisions of
this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.”159 Most
importantly, the ASEAN Charter appears to dilute the consensus requirement
in decision-making. While the Charter states that “[a]s a basic principle,
decision-making in ASEAN shall be based on consultation and consensus”,160
the failure to achieve a consensus will vest the ASEAN Summit with the
153

Thio, Li-ann. “Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: ‘Promises
to Keep and Miles to Go Before I Sleep”, 2 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 1 (1999).
154
ASEAN Charter, Chapter II (Legal Personality), Article 3.
155
ASEAN Charter, Chapter VI, Article 17. Chapter VI, Article 19(2) also
provides that “the conditions of immunities and privileges of the Permanent
Representatives and officials on ASEAN duties shall be governed by the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations or in accordance with the national law of the
ASEAN State concerned.”
156
Preamble to the ASEAN Charter, Seventh Clause.
157
ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(i).
158
ASEAN Charter, Chapter I, Article 2 (Principles), Section 2(h).
159
ASEAN Charter, Chapter III (Membership), Article 5(2)
160
ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII (Decision-Making), Article 20(1).

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LEGAL INFORMATION

430

[Vol. 36.3

authority to “decide how a specific decision can be made”, a mechanism by
which the ASEAN Summit can opt out of the consensus requirement on a
case to case basis.161
It would appear, therefore, that the “new” ASEAN contemplated in
the ASEAN Charter bears an “objective” legal personality since the
organization’s existence arises from the satisfaction of international legal
requirements for ‘organizationhood’:
1. the possession of the organization’s own “distinct will” apart
from that of its members, evidenced by the organization’s power
to take binding decisions upon the entire membership through the
vote of a mere majority of its members;
2. the presence of organs bearing special tasks, defining the position
of members in relation to the Organization; and
3. the grant of legal capacity, privileges, and immunities to the
Organization in the territory of each of its member States.162
ASEAN’s acquisition of an “objective” legal personality under the
ASEAN Charter (in addition to its “relative” or “subjective” legal personality
conferred by its membership under the present framework of the TAC and the
Bangkok Declaration) has implications for its responsibility as an
international organization, and for the ‘residuary’ responsibility of its member
States, to third parties. If ASEAN under the ASEAN Charter were to be
viewed as a “distinct legal entity from its member-states”, it would be difficult
to attribute responsibility per se to its Member States for acts ascribed to or
authored by ASEAN. However, if Member States’ residuary responsibility to
third parties is to be affirmed even under the ‘new’ ASEAN, the process will
likely take the shape of either: 1) “secondary member-state responsibility”,
where the third party must first present its claim to ASEAN, and recourse to
the Member States would be had only if ASEAN is in default in providing an
adequate remedy; or 2) “indirect responsibility”, where Member States are
deemed a priori responsible to the organization to meet its obligations
towards third parties.163

161

ASEAN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 20(2).
KLABBERS, JAN. AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
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In any event, while institutional change does not guarantee
international compliance, what is deeply significant for the Southeast Asian
region is its Member-States commitment to accountability. After over forty
(40) years of (generally) informal and non-binding cooperative measures and
voluntarist actions and initiatives by ASEAN member-States, the commitment
to institutional and membership accountability under the ASEAN Charter is
still a positive step towards achieving regional compliance with international
law.

